PCI DSS compliance for small online stores starts at checkout
The checkout page decides between SAQ A and SAQ A-EP. We read the PCI Council's 2025 rule on scripts, iframes and redirects, and what each form asks of a store.
In January 2025 the PCI Security Standards Council rewrote the shortest questionnaire an online shop can file, and the new edition replaced the old one at the end of March that year.
For PCI DSS compliance for small online stores, that rewrite moved the line between SAQ A and SAQ A-EP onto the checkout page itself. Turnover plays no part in the choice. What counts is which server delivers each element of the payment form to the shopper's browser, the processor's or the store's own.
The gap between the two forms is wide on paper. In SAQ A the questions fill pages 6 to 24. In SAQ A-EP they run from page 4 to page 66 and cover all twelve PCI DSS requirement families, against the seven families that SAQ A asks a store to answer.
We read both questionnaires in their current versions in October 2026, along with the Council's notes on the 2025 change, the card schemes' validation tables and the guidance two platforms publish for their merchants. The documents that speak to checkout design point the same way.
A store that keeps every card field inside its processor's frame or hosted page files the short form. A store that builds the payment page itself files the long one.
What does PCI DSS compliance for small online stores require?
Every merchant that takes cards falls under PCI DSS, but the duty to prove compliance, and the form used for it, is set by the card brands and the acquirer rather than by the Council.
The Council's page for merchants puts the size question plainly: “Whether a small merchant is required to validate compliance is determined by the individual payment brands”. Questions about validation go to the acquirer or the brand.
Enforcement of the standard sits outside the Council. Its January 2025 note on SAQ A says validation requirements are set by brands, acquirers and payment facilitators, and it calls those bodies compliance enforcing entities.
A small store therefore deals with two separate duties. One is meeting the requirements that fit its setup, and the other is filing whatever document its acquirer or processor asks for, usually a Self-Assessment Questionnaire with an Attestation of Compliance.
Each questionnaire opens with a list of eligibility criteria. Failing any one of them sends the store to a longer form.
Stripe's PCI guide shows how steep that ladder gets. Merchants that pass card numbers directly to its API land on SAQ D, and its table describes that form as the most demanding of them all, to be proved again every year.
SAQ A vs SAQ A-EP: what separates the two forms?
SAQ A vs SAQ A-EP comes down to one eligibility line about where the elements of the payment page come from.
The short form requires that “All elements of the payment page(s)/form(s) delivered to the customer’s browser originate only and directly from a PCI DSS compliant TPSP/payment processor”. TPSP is the Council's abbreviation for a third-party service provider.
A single change of wording separates the long form. Its criterion reads “Each element of the payment page(s) delivered to the customer’s browser originates from either the merchant’s website or a PCI DSS compliant TPSP”.
In practice the A-EP merchant builds the page itself. The questionnaire describes a website that “does not receive account data but controls how customers, or their account data, are redirected to a PCI DSS compliant TPSP/payment processor”.
Neither form lets a store keep, process or send card data electronically on its own systems, and both accept paper receipts only when those papers did not arrive electronically in the first place.
Control over the page moves a store up a form. An A-EP site can change what the shopper sees while paying. For that reason the Council treats the site as part of the card data environment. The site still never receives a card number.
Mail and telephone orders fit SAQ A as well. SAQ A-EP applies only to e-commerce channels.
Which checkout designs keep a store on SAQ A?
Three checkout designs can keep an online store on SAQ A: a full redirect to the processor, a processor's form embedded in an iframe, and a payment link that takes the shopper off the site entirely.
The questionnaire does not treat those designs the same way. Its note says the requirements that protect computer systems still apply to the merchant page that holds a redirect and to the page that embeds the processor's form.
Those pages never touch a card number. The Council's view is that they still shape how the number travels.
A shop that emails a link to pay on the processor's own website has no such page in scope at all, and the questionnaire lets it mark those requirements as not applicable.
Stripe's guide maps its products onto the same lines. Its Checkout and Elements products “host all card data collection inputs within an iframe served from Stripe’s domain (not yours)”, and the guide places both under SAQ A.
Older code sits elsewhere in that table. Stripe.js v2 goes under SAQ A-EP, because card data is typed into a form hosted on the merchant's own site, and a business moves to SAQ D once its own servers pass card details to Stripe's API.
Stripe's integration security guide gives a rough size for that last jump. A business taking untokenized card numbers on its own page might have to meet more than 300 security controls.
For a store owner the choice is therefore a design brief. Custom card fields drawn by the store's own code buy visual freedom at the price of the long questionnaire.
What did the 2025 script rule change for iframe checkouts?
The January 2025 revision took three requirements out of SAQ A and replaced them with a single eligibility promise about scripts.
Requirement 6.4.3 on payment page scripts went first. Requirement 11.6.1 on change detection followed, along with the targeted risk analysis behind it. In their place sits a new criterion: “The merchant has confirmed that their site is not susceptible to attacks from scripts that could affect the merchant’s e-commerce system(s)”.
The Council presented the change as a reporting matter. Its announcement says the edits “do not remove or diminish the underlying requirements within PCI DSS”.
The switch and the new script duties shared a date. The October 2024 edition of SAQ A was retired at the end of March 2025, the same point at which the script requirements took effect across PCI DSS for all other merchants and service providers.
A month after the revision the Council published FAQ 1588. It explains how a merchant can make the new confirmation and accepts either of two approaches, the first being to protect the page with techniques like those in the removed requirements, run by the merchant or by a third party.
The second is a confirmation from the processor that its embedded form, set up as instructed, “includes techniques that protect the merchant’s payment page from script attacks”.
The FAQ also limits who has to make the promise at all, since it applies only to stores whose page embeds the processor's form, such as one or more iframes.
For redirects the Council is explicit. It says the criterion “does not apply to e-commerce merchants with a webpage that redirects customers from the merchant’s webpage to a TPSP/payment processor”. Merchants that fully outsource payment, for example by emailing a link to the processor's site, sit outside it too.
The threat behind the rule appears in the Council's e-skimming guidance, announced in March 2025. That note says “Scripts running in consumers’ browsers are now a significant target for attackers seeking to steal payment card data”.
For an iframe store the practical test is a document. A written statement from the processor on script protection is one of the two approaches the FAQ accepts, and it rests on controls the processor already runs.
What extra work comes with SAQ A-EP?
SAQ A-EP applies the full set of technical controls to the web server that builds the payment page.
Its contents list all twelve requirement families, from network security controls in Requirement 1 to logging in Requirement 10. SAQ A lists seven of them.
The families missing from the short form are network controls, encryption in transit, anti-malware, access limited by business need, and the logging of every access to system components.
Script control returns as a direct duty. Requirement 6.4.3 in SAQ A-EP opens with “All payment page scripts that are loaded and executed in the consumer’s browser are managed as follows”. What follows is an authorization method, an integrity check and an inventory with a written justification for each script, covering scripts from the store's own environment and from third and fourth parties.
One boundary in the applicability note helps. It says the requirement “does not apply to an entity for scripts in a TPSP’s/payment processor’s embedded payment page/form”, so the processor's own frame stays the processor's job.
Requirement 11.6.1 adds tamper detection for the payment page. It has to alert staff to unauthorized changes in security headers and script contents as the shopper's browser receives them, at least once weekly or at an interval set by the store's own risk analysis.
Logging is the recurring cost of the long form. SAQ A-EP asks for audit logs on all system components. Security events need a review at least once daily.
Log history must be kept for a year. The latest three months must stay immediately available for analysis.
External penetration testing comes on top. Under Requirement 11.4 it happens at least once every twelve months and after any significant change, carried out by a qualified internal resource or an outside firm with organizational independence from the people who run the site.
One task appears in both forms for a store with a redirect or an embedded form. SAQ A keeps external vulnerability scans by an Approved Scanning Vendor at least once every three months, and after the first assessment a passing scan is expected in every quarter.
Who checks whether a small store filed its questionnaire?
The acquirer or the processor collects the questionnaire, and the card brands set the volume thresholds that decide which document it wants.
Visa sorts merchants by their yearly Visa transactions across all channels. Its US table puts merchants above six million transactions at Level 1 with a Report on Compliance, and it asks Level 2 and Level 3 merchants to complete and submit an SAQ every year.
On that Visa page the lowest band covers fewer than one million e-commerce transactions a year. No tier below it is listed.
Mastercard is looser at the bottom of its scale. Its lowest tier holds all other merchants. That tier sits below a band starting above twenty thousand e-commerce transactions a year, and its footnote says “Level 4 merchants are required to comply with the PCI DSS, although validation of compliance to Mastercard is not required”.
Visa's rules put the financial pressure on the bank. Its page says Visa may charge a non-compliance assessment to the issuer or acquirer when a merchant does not comply.
Processors fill the gap with programs of their own. Stripe's guide says users with fewer than twenty thousand online transactions a year are enrolled automatically in its Risk Management Program, and it asks them for quarterly scans by an Approved Scanning Vendor as well.
Suppliers are on the list too. Requirement 12.8.4 in SAQ A calls for a program to monitor each service provider's PCI DSS status at least once a year.
Shopify publishes its service provider Attestation of Compliance and a quarterly scan attestation on its compliance reports page. Viewing the attestation takes a login to a Shopify account.
Certificates and badges do not replace those forms. The Council's FAQ 1220 states that “The only documentation recognized for PCI DSS validation are the official form documents from the PCI SSC website”.
What do the PCI documents leave open?
The hardest judgment stays with the merchant and its acquirer, namely what counts as proof that a page is not susceptible to script attacks.
In its summary of FAQ 1588 the Council offers no checklist. Nothing in that summary says what a processor's confirmation must contain, and it sets no interval for asking the processor again once the first statement is on file.
The scheme tables leave the smallest stores with little guidance of their own, because Visa's US page stops at its third level and Mastercard asks for no validation at its lowest tier. In practice the acquirer's or processor's program decides what a small store files.
None of the pages we read puts a price on an approved scan, a penetration test or script monitoring, so on these sources the cost gap between SAQ A and SAQ A-EP cannot be stated in dollars or pounds.
Individual verdicts are outside the Council's role too. Its e-skimming announcement says it does not enforce compliance. Nor does it rule on whether a given implementation complies.
The last word on a store's form belongs to its acquirer or processor. A Qualified Security Assessor can review a checkout design against the eligibility criteria, and the store's lawyer can read the merchant agreement for what it says about compliance.
Where does a small store put its card fields?
Our view is that PCI DSS compliance for small online stores is decided when the checkout is designed.
A processor's hosted page or iframe keeps the store on SAQ A, and the redirect version also keeps it clear of the script criterion. An iframe store needs the processor's written confirmation of script protection in its compliance file before the acquirer asks.
Stripe's own security guide warns that JavaScript loaded from other sites ties a store's security to theirs. Fewer third-party tags on the checkout page mean fewer scripts to account for.
A custom card form on the store's own domain remains a legitimate choice for brands that need one. It brings SAQ A-EP with daily log reviews, weekly page checks and yearly penetration tests, and that cost belongs in the design budget from the first sketch of the page.
The current questionnaires follow PCI DSS v4.0.1. We will read the next revision of SAQ A and SAQ A-EP when the Council publishes it, starting with the script criterion.
Sources
- PCI SSC blog, January 2025 changes to the SAQ A form blog.pcisecuritystandards.org.
- PCI SSC blog, February 2025 note on FAQ 1588 blog.pcisecuritystandards.org.
- Council announcement of the e-skimming information supplement blog.pcisecuritystandards.org.
- Council note on compliance certificates and FAQ 1220 blog.pcisecuritystandards.org.
- PCI SSC page for merchants pcisecuritystandards.org.
- Self-Assessment Questionnaire A, PCI DSS v4.0.1 revision 1 (copy hosted by the Nebraska State Treasurer) treasurer.nebraska.gov.
- Self-Assessment Questionnaire A-EP, October 2024 edition (same state copy) treasurer.nebraska.gov.
- Visa, Account Information Security Program and PCI usa.visa.com.
- Mastercard, Site Data Protection and PCI mastercard.com.
- Stripe, A guide to PCI compliance stripe.com.
- Stripe Documentation, Integration security guide docs.stripe.com.
- Shopify, Compliance reports shopify.com.
- Shopify Help Center, Viewing Shopify's compliance reports help.shopify.com.